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DARK SARCASM IN THE CLASSROOM: THE
FAILURE OF THE COURTS TO RECOGNIZE
STUDENTS’ SEVERE EMOTIONAL HARM AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EMILY F. SUSKI*
ABSTRACT
Sometimes the very people who are supposed to teach, nurture, and
protect students in public schools—the students’ teachers, principals,
coaches, and other school officials—are instead the people who harm
them. Public school officials have beaten students, causing significant
physical harm. They have also left students suffering from depression,
suicidal ideation, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. When school
officials cause such severe harm to students, all the federal courts of
appeals to consider the issue have concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment at least in theory protects them, regardless of whether the
form of the harm is emotional or physical. Yet, an analysis of the cases
across the circuits reveals that the courts have yet to actually find that a
case of severe emotional harm on its own violates the Constitution, even
though they have been willing to find physical harm unconstitutional. Not
only do the courts not find stand-alone emotional harm sufficient to make
out a constitutional violation, they also collectively evaluate students’
emotional harm very differently than their physical harm.
This Article explores the distinction in the way the courts treat standalone emotional harm in public school students’ Fourteenth Amendment
cases. It contends that if the courts are going to recognize that the
Constitution protects students from severe harm regardless of its physical
or emotional form, as they do, then the distinction in treatment of
emotional harm is untenable. Drawing on substantive due process theory,
psychology, and law and emotions theory, this Article argues that the
distinction in treatment is the result of emotions stigma, analogous to the
long-recognized phenomenon of mental illness stigma, that discredits
students’ emotions-based claims. It proposes a paradigm for evaluating
students’ emotional harm that responds to and helps to overcome
emotions stigma so the Constitution will protect students when school
officials cause them severe emotional harm.
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In T.W. v. School Board of South Seminole County,1 T.W., a student with autism,
developmental delays, anxiety, and other psychological disabilities, suffered severe
emotional harm as the result of abuse by his teacher, Kathleen Garrett.2 Over a
period of several months, Garrett taunted T.W. and called him vulgar names,
including “lazy, an asshole, a pig, and a jerk.”3 Garrett would provoke T.W. into
acting out by “pick[ing] and nag[ging] at him until he would just get to the point
where he couldn’t take it anymore” and would act out.4 Then Garrett would
physically restrain him.5 Garrett restrained T.W. even though she knew from
psychological evaluations that physical restraints would be counterproductive as a
disciplinary method and could cause T.W. psychological harm.6 As a result of
Garrett’s abuse, T.W. did suffer psychological harm. His psychological disabilities
got worse.7 His maladaptive behaviors intensified. He began “‘urinating all over the
place.’”8 He would cry on his way to and from school.9 He also developed symptoms
of a new disability, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), and he ultimately
dropped out of school entirely because of Garrett’s abuse.10 Despite this harm and an
acknowledgement that emotionally harming students could violate the Constitution,
the Eleventh Circuit found the infliction of emotional harm on T.W. to be
constitutional.11
When public school officials harm students either emotionally or physically, it
can implicate the students’ substantive due process rights.12 The T.W. outcome
notwithstanding, all of the federal courts of appeals that have heard students’ claims
have concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment protects them from severe harm
imposed by school officials.13 In doing so, the courts have found students’ physical
1

T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010).

2

Id. at 593.

3

Id. at 594.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 608 n.6.

7

Id. at 596.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 602.

12

Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that excessive corporal
punishment in school violates students’ substantive due process rights).
13

Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001); Metzger v.
Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988); Hall, 621 F.2d at 611; Webb v. McCullough, 828
F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir.
1988); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996); Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817
F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987); Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th
Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit recognizes “a student's liberty interest in maintaining bodily
integrity” but will find it violated only in the absence of any legitimate state interest, such as a
disciplinary interest. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000). The
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harm unconstitutional.14 No federal court of appeals, however, has found a student’s
severe emotional harm alone unconstitutional.15
This lack of stand-alone success does not represent a wholesale refusal by the
courts to acknowledge that emotional harm meted out by public school officials
First and District of Columbia Circuits have not heard a case based on a student’s substantive
due process claims. In Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th
Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit considered facts giving rise to both a Fourth Amendment
unreasonable seizure claim and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. It
analyzed and rejected the claim under the Fourth Amendment and did not address the
Fourteenth Amendment claim in any substantive way. Id. The Supreme Court has never ruled
on the matter. However, it denied certiorari in the Tenth Circuit case Garcia ex rel. Garcia v.
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). In Garcia, the
Court concluded that students have “‘the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of
personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as
literally to shock the conscience of a court.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613).
14

See, e.g., Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (finding allegations that a gym teacher dragged a
student across the gym floor, choked him, and slammed his head against the bleachers
sufficient to make out a substantive due process claim); Metzger, 841 F.2d at 519-20
(allegations that a teacher held student from behind in such a way that the student lost
consciousness and broke his nose sufficient for a substantive due process case); Hall, 621 F.2d
at 613 (allegations of paddling at school established a substantive due process claim); Webb,
828 F.2d at 1154 (allegations that principal grabbed a student, slapped her, and threw her
against bathroom wall made out a substantive due process claim); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1299
(allegations a principal slapped, punched, and choked students sufficient for a substantive due
process claim); Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655) (finding allegations that a principal beat a student
twice with a split wood paddle established a substantive due process claim); Neal, 229 F.3d
1076-77 (allegations that a coach hit a student in the eye with a metal lock, resulting in the
loss of the eye, made out a substantive due process claim). Although the federal courts of
appeals have been thus far unwilling to find students’ emotional harm unconstitutional, some
federal district courts have been willing to find allegations of emotional harm unconstitutional.
See, e.g. W.E.T. v. Mitchell, No. 1:06CV487, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68376, at *17 (E.D.N.C
Sept. 14, 2007) (explicitly finding that allegations of severe mental and emotional harm meet
the severe injury requirement for a student’s substantive due process claim).
15

Seven of the nine Circuits that have heard students’ substantive due process claims have
reviewed cases in which the claims have been based in whole or in part on allegations of
emotional harm. Johnson, 239 F.2d at 252; H.H. v. Moffett, 335 Fed. Appx. 306, 309 (4th Cir.
2009); Meeker v. Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 319 (4th Cir. 2005); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep.
Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1987); Costello v. Mitchell, 266 F.3d 916, 920-21
(8th Cir. 2001); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1304; Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1996); T.W. v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610
F.3d 588, 601 (11th Cir. 2010). None of the claims have been successful on the basis of
emotional harm alone. The Fifth Circuit in Jefferson heard the substantive due process claim
of a student who alleged only emotional harm as a result of being tied to a chair in school for
nearly two days, and the Court let it go forward. Jefferson, 817 F.2d at 304-05. However, the
Court based its conclusion solely on the conduct of the school officials in physically
restraining the student and did not consider the emotional harm alleged. Id. Later, the Fifth
Circuit reiterated that it did not decide "whether non-physical injuries (which are all that were
alleged in Jefferson, although the claimed constitutional wrongs clearly involved prolonged
physical distress) would satisfy the . . . ‘severe injury’ requirement. Instead, we focused on the
outrageous [physical] conduct of the defendants.” Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 906 (5th Cir.
1998).
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could violate students’ substantive due process rights.16 Indeed, two circuits have
explicitly recognized that stand-alone emotional harm inflicted on students could
theoretically be unconstitutional.17 Others have implicitly recognized it as
unconstitutional.18 Yet even in cases like T.W., where the emotional harm alleged
was very severe and as or more severe than physical harm alleged in meritorious
substantive due process claims, the theoretical has not become the actual: emotional
harm is still found insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.19
This Article draws and expands upon relevant scholarship, including substantive
due process theory, law and emotions, and psychology, to argue that students like
T.W. who suffer severe stand-alone emotional harm at the hands of public school
officials should be more than theoretically protected by the Constitution.20 The
courts’ distinction in treatment between emotional and physical harm is untenable
and reflects that an emotions stigma is at work in these cases. What this Article calls
“emotions stigma” is analogous to the long-recognized phenomenon of mental
illness stigma.21 It is the skeptical, even negative, view of the operation of emotions
and emotional harm that discredits emotions-based legal claims. Emotions stigma is
rooted in the historic understanding of reason as capable of taming emotions and is
16

Even in rejecting specific allegations of emotional harm brought by public school
students, the courts have acknowledged psychological harm could make out a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest claim. For example, in Abeyta, the Tenth Circuit rejected a
student’s substantive due process claim based in emotional harm but stated, “we are unwilling
to hold that actions which inflict only psychological damage may never achieve the high level
of ‘a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience,’
necessary to constitute a substantive due process violation.” Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1257-58
(quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613).
17

Id. at 1257-58; T.W., 610 F.3d at 601-02. Significantly, no Circuit has found that
emotional harm could never violate students’ substantive due process rights.
18
The courts have implicitly recognized emotional harm violates the Constitution by
finding concomitant allegations of both physical and emotional harm sufficient to make out a
substantive due process claim. See infra note 64.
19

See, e.g., T.W., 610 F.3d at 602.

20

See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and Emotions, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1997 (2010); William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law”,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3 (1988–89); David B. Feldman & Christian S. Crandall, Dimensions of
Mental Illness Stigma: What About Mental Illness Causes Social Rejection?, 26 J. OF SOC. &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 137 (2007); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion,
Commitment, and Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623 (2009);
Terry A. Maroney, Essay, The Persistent Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629
(2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Judicial Dispassion]; Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common
Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851 (2009) [hereinafter Maroney, Common
Sense]; Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1049 (2006); Bernard Weiner, Raymond P. Perry & Jamie Magnusson, An Attributional
Analysis of Reactions to Stigmas, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 738 (Nov. 1988).
21
Mental illness stigma is the perception of persons with mental illnesses as other.
Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 738-39. One of its primary causes is a lay
perception that the responsibility for mental illness lies with the individual with mental illness.
Id. One of its primary effects is a desire to achieve social distance from the person with mental
illness. Id.
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evidenced in courts’ shallow analyses of students’ emotional harm claims. By
naming and defining emotions stigma, this Article seeks to make it visible so it can
be raised and overcome. It also aims to fill a hole in legal scholarship that has yet to
identify the distinct treatment of emotional harm in students’ substantive due process
cases.22
Part I of this Article explores specifically how the federal courts of appeals have
treated students’ emotional harm differently than their physical harm and why that is
problematic. It begins by explaining the liberty interest at stake in students’
substantive due process cases and the standard for determining when it has been
violated, regardless of whether students raise emotional or physical harm allegations.
Even though that standard is ostensibly the same for students’ physical and
emotional harm, and the courts implicitly or explicitly recognize that emotionally
harming students could violate the Constitution, emotional harm on its own has
never been found unconstitutional. This Part identifies the problems that result from
this distinction in treatment to show that the Constitution should protect students
from severe stand-alone emotional harm. Part II analyzes potential rationales for
why the federal courts of appeals treat students’ emotional and physical harm
distinctly and rejects those rationales as inadequate to explain the treatment of
emotional harm. It then offers an alternative explanation for the federal courts of
appeals’ collective treatment of emotional harm in students’ substantive due process
cases—it contends that an emotions stigma is at work in the courts’ decisions. Part
III proposes ways to overcome emotions stigma by offering a paradigm for
evaluating students’ emotional harm that works within the existing analytic
framework for assessing students’ substantive due process claims. It also advocates
for raising emotions stigma in students’ substantive due process litigation.
I. A COLLECTIVE DISTINCTION IN TREATMENT ACROSS THE CIRCUITS: EMOTIONAL
AND PHYSICAL HARM IN STUDENTS’ SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
Although any public school student who asserts a substantive due process claim
faces an uphill battle to survive even summary judgment,23 physical harm allegations
have surmounted that hurdle. Emotional harm allegations on their own have not.
This is true even though the federal courts of appeals recognize that both physical
and emotional harm of students by school officials could violate the Constitution.
While the federal courts of appeals have not heard vast numbers of these cases, the
22

A great deal of scholarship has directly or indirectly addressed the emotional harm
imposed by students on other students through cyber bullying. See, e.g., Matthew Fenn, A
Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public Schools in a Sticky
Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729 (2013); Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public
Schools' Authority to Discipline Students' Off-Campus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181 (2011); Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyberharrassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV.
1213 (2003). However, very little scholarship has addressed the emotional harm of students by
school officials. See, e.g., Lewis M. Wasserman, Corporal Punishment in K-12 Public School
Settings: Reconsideration of its Constitutional Dimensions Thirty Years After Ingraham v.
Wright, 26 TOURO L. REV. 1029 (2011).
23

A student must allege facts to support a finding that a school official’s actions “literally
. . . shock the conscience,” a high bar. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); see
also Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257
(10th Cir. 1996) (noting the “shock the conscience” bar is a “high level”).
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cases they have heard establish a pattern of distinct treatment of students’ emotional
harm. As this Part will show, the distinction in treatment leaves students who suffer
even severe, unavoidable emotional harm at the hands of state officials, the very type
of the harm the Constitution is uniquely capable of addressing, virtually unprotected
by the Constitution. First, though, the Part will explain students’ substantive due
process rights in school and how those rights apply at least in theory to both
emotional and physical harm.
A. Students’ Substantive Due Process Rights in School
In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court concluded that public school students
subjected to corporal punishment have Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests
giving rise to procedural due process rights.24 In Ingraham, the Supreme Court left
open the question of “whether or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a
public school child may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to
vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.”25 Since then, the vast
majority—i.e., nine—of the federal circuit courts have heard cases where students
have alleged that school officials violated their substantive due process rights.26 All
have found students to have substantive due process rights in school.27 All but one of
those courts28 have followed the seminal Fourth Circuit case Hall v. Tawney in both
24

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977). The Court went on to find that the state
of Florida had sufficient common law “constraints and remedies” in place to satisfy the
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 682-83.
25

Id. at 679 n.47.

26

See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.

27

Id.; Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding students have a “constitutional ‘right to be free from the use of excessive force’” in
school (quoting Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 1995)); Metzger v. Osbeck,
510 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (determining that “a decision to discipline a student, if
accomplished through excessive force and appreciable physical pain, may constitute . . . a
violation of substantive due process prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment”); Webb v.
McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d at 613,
in identifying that “‘the right of students to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal
privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to
shock the conscience’”); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855, F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that “at some point the administration of corporal punishment may violate a
student's liberty interest in his personal security and substantive due process rights”); P.B. v.
Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[E]xcessive force by a principal against a
student violated the student’s constitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment protects
against the government’s interference with ‘an individual’s bodily integrity.’” (quoting
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc))); Garcia ex rel. Garcia
v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (finding
students have “‘the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and
bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the
conscience of a court’” (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613)); Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Ed., 229
F.3d 1069, 1075 (concluding that when “an exercise of corporal punishment is ‘so brutal,
demeaning, and harmful as to literally shock the conscience of the court’ . . . a student’s
substantive due process rights are implicated” (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613)).
28

See supra text accompanying note 15 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s substantive due
process decisions with respect to claims by public school students).
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defining the right and, with some minimal variation,29 the elements for analyzing
whether a school official has violated it.30
In Hall, the Fourth Circuit heard a substantive due process claim based on
allegations of excessive corporal punishment in school. The Court concluded that
students have “the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy
and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to
shock the conscience.”31 The Court grounded its conclusions in the understanding
that “the existence of this right to ultimate bodily security the most fundamental
aspect of personal privacy is unmistakably established in our constitutional decisions
as an attribute of ordered liberty.”32 The Hall Court, however, also observed “that
the substantive due process right is quite different than a claim of assault and battery
under tort law.”33 It noted that “not every violation of state tort and criminal assault
laws will be a violation of [substantive due process], but some of course may be.”34
To determine whether this right has been violated, Hall directed that courts should
inquire into:
Whether the force applied [by the school official] caused injury so severe,
was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was inspired by malice
or sadism rather than a merely unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a
brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience.35
Although Hall involved allegations of excessive corporal punishment, its
progeny in the Fourth Circuit and beyond have followed it irrespective of whether
the case involved corporal punishment.36 Whether a school official acts to discipline
29

For a review of courts’ use of the Hall standard in corporal punishment cases
specifically, see Wasserman, supra note 22.
30
Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (citing Hall in setting forth the factors to be considered in
students’ excessive force claims); Metzger, 510 F.2d at 620 (citing Hall in finding the
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment implicated); Webb, 828 F.2d
at 1158 (quoting Hall in full when setting forth the substantive right and the factors to be
considered in determining a student’s substantive due process claim); Wise, 844 F.2d at 564
(citing Hall in finding a substantive due process right for students in school and in setting
forth the factors to consider in evaluating whether it was violated); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1302
(citing Hall in setting forth that students have a substantive due process liberty right to bodily
integrity in school); Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655 (quoting Hall in “defining the constitutional tort”
and the factors for determining it); Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Hall in defining the
substantive due process right and citing Hall in outlining the factors to consider in assessing it,
though separating them in to objective and subjective components).
31

Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

The courts often fail to even make a point of distinguishing whether the acts in question
were for the purpose of corporal punishment or not—they simply apply the Hall test. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a
substantive due process right under the Hall test without discussing whether the test applies to
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or not, if the actions transgress “the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of
personal privacy and bodily security” through means that shock the conscience, then
the official has violated a student’s substantive due process rights.37 In addition, the
courts use the Hall framework irrespective of whether the students have alleged
physical or emotional harm and have thereby found concomitantly alleged physical
and emotional harm (but not stand-alone emotional harm) unconstitutional.38 They
have thus either implicitly or explicitly found that both physical and emotional harm
of students by state officials could be unconstitutional.

actions intended as corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes or not); Meeker v.
Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying the Hall test without
considering whether beating a wrestling teammate with the approval of a coach was corporal
punishment); Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding a
student’s allegations that a teacher called her names and threw a book at her face insufficient
to make out a substantive due process claim without regard for whether it was corporal
punishment or not); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a principal’s
treatment of students sufficient to establish substantive due process claims without
considering whether the actions were intended as corporal punishment); Abeyta ex rel.
Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 1996)
(not finding a constitutional violation based on emotional harm claims but stating “we are
unwilling to hold that actions which inflict only psychological damage many never achieve
the high level of ‘a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience’” without regard for whether the harm resulted from corporal punishment). In
T.W., the student alleged that the verbal abuse he suffered was not corporal punishment, but
the court did not analyze this contention—it ignored it. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S.
Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 598-99 (11th Cir. 2010). It only addressed whether the
teacher’s physical abuse of T.W. was for the purpose of discipline. Id. It concluded all
incidents save one potential use of force were for the purpose of discipline and therefore were
corporal punishment. Id. With respect to the one use of force that may not have been for
discipline, tripping T.W., the Court stated that it would still apply a “shocks the conscience”
test even if it were not a disciplinary use of force. Id. It then concluded that use of force did
not meet that standard without articulating a more precise analysis. Id.
37

Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at
613); see also Nolan v. Nashville City Sch., 589 F.3d 257, 269 (6th Cir. 2009) (reiterating that
students’ substantive due process rights protect them whether or not a school official acts with
the purpose of imposing corporal punishment).
38

See, e.g., Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (noting that “various emotional injuries” were
included among the injuries alleged by the students, but following the Hall test); Meeker, 415
F.3d at 319 (noting the student’s abuse resulted in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder treatment,
among other things, and following Hall to analyze those emotional and also physical harm
allegations); Costello, 266 F.3d at 920 (noting that the student suffered mentally as a result of
her treatment in school but not varying the substantive due process analysis in any way based
on that allegation); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1304 (identifying emotional harm as among the harm
suffered by the student-plaintiffs as a result of the treatment they received from a school
official but not changing the analysis as a result); Abeyta, 77 F.3d at1257-58 (acknowledging
that psychological damage could violate substantive due process if it met the “shock the
conscience” threshold set by Hall); T.W., 610 F.3d at 598-600 (considering allegations of
emotional harm but still following Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Ed., 229 F.3d 1069, which
followed Hall).
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B. Different Treatment of Emotional Harm: An Undefined Torture Standard and
Summary Analyses
Despite the courts’ implicit or explicit acknowledgement that both emotional and
physical harm could violate the Constitution and use of the same analytic framework
for both emotional and physical harm, they treat students’ emotional and physical
harm in very different ways. Some courts hold students’ emotional harm to a torture
standard that they do not define. Others fail to do more than summarily analyze the
emotional harm. Significantly, the courts do not consistently, if ever, treat physical
harm in either way.39
1. The Undefined Torture Standard
Two Circuits, the Tenth and Eleventh, have held students’ emotional, but not
physical, harm to an undefined torture standard. The Tenth Circuit first articulated
this undefined standard, and the Eleventh Circuit followed it. In Abeyta v. Chama
Valley Independent School, the Tenth Circuit heard the claim of a twelve year-old
girl who alleged that her teacher repeatedly called her a prostitute in front of the
class for over a month and a half.40 The teacher’s taunts caused her classmates to
also call her a prostitute repeatedly over the same period of time.41 In rejecting the
girl’s emotional harm as insufficient to make out a Fourteenth Amendment claim,
the court did not reject the notion that emotional harm could violate the
Constitution.42 To the contrary, it stated that it could “imagine a case where
psychological harassment might be so severe that it would amount to torture equal or
greater to the stomach pumping abuse condemned [by the Supreme Court] in
Rochin” and therefore would violate the Constitution.43 Finding that the emotional
harm did not rise to this level, though, the Court rejected the substantive due process
claim.
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead in T.W. v. School Board
of South Seminole County, the case described briefly in this Article’s Introduction. In
T.W., the Eleventh Circuit held the allegations of emotional harm to the same
undefined torture standard used by the Tenth Circuit. It quoted the Tenth Circuit in

39

While occasionally courts fail to do more than a cursory analysis of physical harm, they
also do fully analyze it. For example, in Kirkland v. Greene County Board of Education, the
Eleventh Circuit analyzed the student’s allegations of physical harm in one sentence.
Kirkland, 347 F.3d 903, 904 (11th Cir. 2003). However, in T.W. the Eleventh Circuit analyzed
each instance of physical force independently over the course of multiple paragraphs and
pages. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599-601. Therefore, the courts’ occasional failure to fully analyze the
students’ physical harm does not constitute the pattern it does with respect to their treatment
of emotional harm.
40

Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1254-55.

41

Id. The opinion did not detail the harm the student suffered; the opinion only identified
the harm as psychological harm. Id.
42

Id. at 1257-58.

43

Id.
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asserting this vague standard.44 It then rejected the emotional harm in T.W. as
insufficient to meet it.45
Neither the Tenth nor Eleventh Circuit defined “torture” in these cases. Both
courts referenced the stomach pumping found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in Rochin v. California as the sort of behavior that is torture. Rochin is a Fourteenth
Amendment case in which the Supreme Court reversed a drug conviction because
the police obtained drug evidence by, among other things, directing that the
defendant’s stomach be pumped against his will. This Rochin reference, however, is
largely unhelpful in sussing out what amounts to torture in student substantive due
process cases. First, the Supreme Court did not term the actions in Rochin
“torture.”46 Rochin therefore contains no definition or explanation of torture.47
Second, even if stomach pumping is torture,48 the analogy is unhelpful because
stomach pumping is physical in nature. Therefore, it provides little guidance as to
what kind of emotional abuse or harm would amount to torture.
Equally problematic, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do not hold physical harm
to any torture standard—defined or undefined. And both courts have found physical
harm allegations sufficient to make out a substantive due process violation without
mention of a torture standard. In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, the Tenth Circuit
first concluded that students have substantive due process rights in school.49 It based
its conclusions on a nine-year-old girl’s allegations that a principal beat her on two

44

T.W., 610 F.3d at 598.

45
Id. at 601-02. Notably, T.W.’s emotional harm could arguably satisfy the definition of
torture contained in the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The elements of that
definition are “(1) an act; (2) severe pain or suffering; (3) physical or mental pain; (4) intent;
(5) particular purposes, including punishment; (6) involvement of a public official; and (7) the
absence of pain or suffering from lawful sanctions.” GAIL MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 6
(2005). Garrett engaged in not one but multiple acts that resulted in T.W. suffering severe
mental pain, including the development of symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. T.W.,
610 F.3d at 608 n.6. Garrett intended and had the purpose to cause this pain and suffering as
evidenced both by the fact that she knew from psychological assessments of T.W. that it likely
would cause it, and she her stated purpose was punishment. Id. at 596, 599. Finally, as a
public school teacher, Garrett was a public official, and no evidence in the record suggested
that any law sanctioned the pain and suffering. To the contrary, Garrett was convicted of one
count of criminal child abuse for her actions. Id. at 597.
46
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (petitioner was arrested on suspicion of drug
possession and sale, taken to the hospital, and while at the hospital doctors pumped his
stomach at the direction of police in order to determine if he had swallowed illegal drugs).
47

Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines “torture” in two ways: “1 a: anguish of body or
mind; agony; b: something that causes agony or pain; 2: the infliction of intense pain (as from
burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure.” Torture
Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/torture?show=0&t=1372823523 (last visited July 2, 2013). Whether the courts
meant to incorporate some or all of these dictionary definitions is unclear.
48

And certainly there is an argument that it does constitute torture. See supra note 45.

49

Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
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occasions with a split wood paddle.50 The Court followed Hall in finding that
students have substantive due process rights in school and the school official’s
actions in violation of those rights in Garcia.51 In doing so, it made no mention of
torture.52
Similarly, in cases such as Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, Kirkland
v. Greene County Board of Education, and Hatfield v. O’Neill, the Eleventh Circuit
has found allegations of physical harm imposed on students by school officials
sufficient to make out substantive due process violations.53 In all of those cases, the
students alleged physical abuse as the bases for their substantive due process
claims.54 In those cases, the Court never identified torture as a requirement for
finding, as it did, that the students’ harm was unconstitutional.
2. Summary Analyses
Even more frequently than the courts hold students’ emotional harm to an
undefined torture standard, they fail to do anything more than summarily analyze it.
Of the nine federal courts of appeals that have heard students’ substantive due
process cases, seven have considered cases alleging some sort of emotional harm.55
All have summarily analyzed these allegations. Many of the courts reference the
allegations of emotional harm somewhere in their opinions. Some courts reference
the alleged emotional harm in the facts.56 Others reference it in their analyses.57
50

The Court based its conclusion on allegations that two beatings of the plaintiff by a
school official left a permanent scar in one instance and serious bruises and long-lasting pain
in the second. Id. at 653.
51

Id. at 655.

52

Id.

53

Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Ed., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); Kirkland v. Greene Cty.
Bd. of Ed., 347 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2003); Hatfield v. O'Neill, 534 F. App'x 838 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam).
54

The student in Neal lost his eye when a coach hit him with a weight lock. Neal, 229
F.3d at 1071. The student in Kirkland suffered migraines when the principal hit him
repeatedly with a metal cane. Kirkland, 347 F.3d at 904. The student in Hatfield was hit on
multiple occasions on her head in the place where she had had a portion of her brain removed,
causing extreme physical pain. Hatfield, 534 F. App'x 838, 840-41. The student was also
subjected to emotional abuse by the teacher, who called her “fat ass” and said she was just
“sucking up oxygen.” Id. at 842. As a result, the student suffered some bruising, vomiting, and
emotional harm in the form of depression. Id. However, the Court focused on the student’s
physical harm and injuries to find a substantive due process violation and only considered the
emotional abuse in concluding the teacher acted with malice. Id. at 847.
55

See supra note 15.

56

Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting
the plaintiff suffered “severe emotional pain for which he underwent psychotherapy”); H.H. v.
Moffett, 335 Fed. Appx. 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating the student became “increasingly
distressed, anxious, and angry about her experiences [at school]” and “would cry or scream”
as she approached school because she was inappropriately restrained in her wheelchair for
hours a day); Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 F.3d 916, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2001)
(stating the teacher in question called the student “retarded,” stupid,” and “dumb’ in front of
her classmates, threw a book, and as a result the student suffered depression and suicidal
ideation).
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Irrespective of where the courts reference the alleged emotional ham, these mere
references do not rise to the level of analysis.
Although the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do something more than reference the
allegations of emotional harm in the cases in which they have considered it, both
have come short of a meaningful analysis of the allegations. As already noted, the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have assessed allegations of emotional harm in light of
an undefined torture standard.58 However, neither engaged in a full analysis of the
emotional harm alleged. Because the courts both failed to define torture,59 they could
not and therefore did not explain why the emotional harm in those cases did not meet
that standard.60 In all other respects, the courts simply ignored the students’
allegations of emotional abuse and harm.61
All of the courts that have barely or summarily analyzed students’ emotional
harm have engaged in at least a relatively more thorough analysis of students’
allegations of physical harm.62 Even when emotional and physical harm allegations
57
Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating in
the analysis only that “various emotional injuries were inflicted” and nothing more anywhere
else in the opinion); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting a number of the
ways physical harm was inflicted and suffered but only making one reference in the analysis
to the “emotional injury” alleged).
58

See supra Part I(B)(1).

59

See supra Part I(B)(1).

60

In T.W., the court’s analysis consisted of one conclusory statement: “after considering
the totality of the circumstances, including T.W.’s psychological injuries, we conclude that
Garrett’s conduct was not so arbitrary and egregious as to support a complaint of a violation
of substantive due process.” T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d
588, 602 (11th Cir. 2010).
61
The courts totally failed to apply the emotional abuse and harm to the elements of the
Hall test. The Tenth Circuit did not assess the alleged emotional abuse of the student in light
of its proportionality, as required by the Hall test it cited as its standard. Abeyta ex rel.
Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 1996).

Although the Eleventh Circuit assessed the need for physical force and the proportionality of
the physical force used in T.W., it completely ignored emotional abuse inflicted on T.W. in
analyzing these factors. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599-602.
62
In cases where students allege both physical and emotional harm and ultimately prevail,
the courts rely on the physical harm to find in favor of the students. Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252
(2d Cir. 2001) (relying almost entirely on the “extremely violent” conduct of the school
official and detailing the physical harm of “head trauma, lacerations, and bruising . . .
requiring hospital treatment” but noting no more than “various emotional injuries were
inflicted”); H.H., 335 Fed. App’x. at 314 (relying entirely on the fact that a child was
restrained in a chair for long periods of time to find a constitutional violation even though the
facts set forth emotional injury, including that the student became “increasingly distressed,
anxious, and angry” and would “cry or scream” when approaching school); P.B. v. Koch, 96
F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the principal’s behavior caused “emotional
injury” but emphasizing the “slapping, punching, and choking” in finding a substantive due
process claim was sufficiently alleged).

In cases where students allege physical and emotional harm and do not succeed in making out
a substantive due process violation, the courts also rely on physical harm and summarily
analyze or ignore the emotional harm. See, e.g., Smith, 298 F.3d at 173 (noting the lack of any
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are brought in the same case, courts still analyze and rely virtually exclusively on
physical harm allegations to decide the cases.63 Relying on allegations of physical
harm and largely or totally ignoring emotional harm means the constitutionality of
government actions against students in school will be measured by the physical harm
alone.
C. The Resulting Problematic Jurisprudential Landscape
Treating emotional harm differently than physical harm, the Circuit Courts have
yet to find any student’s stand-alone emotional harm sufficient to make out a
substantive due process violation. They have therefore denied students who suffer
severe emotional harm in school the unique protections offered by the Constitution.
If the courts are going to recognize that severe harm of students by the State can
violate the Constitution no matter its emotional or physical form, which they do,
then the distinction in treatment of emotional harm is not sustainable or fair. It
denies students suffering severe emotional harm the protections of the Constitution
and effectively allows severe emotional harm of students to go unchecked by the
very constitutional rules that are designed to protect against such abuse of state
authority.64
1. Leaving Students’ Emotional Harm Categorically Lacking in Constitutional
Significance
The Constitution and, in particular, substantive due process, protects individuals
from abuses of government authority.65 Unlike mere torts that protect individuals
from harms wrought by other individuals in their own capacity,66 the Constitution
“asks whether the government has treated someone fairly.”67 When the State—either
justification for the physical harm—a slap—and thereby analyzing its need and severity but
not assessing the alleged “severe emotional pain for which [the student] underwent
psychotherapy” at all before concluding the student had not made out a substantive due
process violation); Costello, 266 F.3d at 921 (analyzing none of the harm specifically but
simply stating the teacher’s behavior in calling the student “retarded,” stupid,” and “dumb’ in
front of her classmates and throwing a book at her was not “sufficiently shocking to the
conscience” without explaining why the student’s consequent depression and suicidal ideation
did not support her substantive due process claim).
63

Id. T.W. provides a clear example of this distinct treatment. In contrast to its evaluation
of T.W.’s emotional harm, which the Court did not analyze in terms of need or
proportionality, the Court analyzed each of the five instances of physical restraint imposed on
T.W. in detail, identifying needs for the physical restraints and assessing their proportionality
and harm. Supra note 36. The Court found the physical force and harm alleged insufficient to
establish a constitutional violation because it found a need for, a proportionality to, and
minimal harm from it. Id.
64
Although tort can remedy the abuse as between two individuals, the abuse of
government authority vis-à-vis the individual cannot be remedied in tort. See infra note 66.
65

Brennan, supra note 20, at 15-15.

66

DANIEL B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (West Pub., Minnesota 2002). Dobbs
emphasizes the “essence of tort is the defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim for
harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victim’s potential for compensation or other
relief.” Id.
67

Brennan, supra note 20, at 16.
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through the action of an individual state actor or otherwise—treats someone in a
significantly unfair way, the Constitution serves “as a last line of defense against
those literally outrageous abuses of official power.”68 Moreover, the possibility of a
lawsuit under the auspices of the Constitution provides “an incentive for government
agents to operate within the confines of their prescribed authority and as a remedy
for vindicating federal civil rights.”69
The collective failure by the federal courts of appeals to find that students’ standalone emotional harm violates the Constitution essentially means almost no or no
amount of emotional harm imposed on students by school officials will rise to the
level of an unconstitutional abuse of government power. Students’ severe emotional
harm, therefore, is just a matter between two individuals. In addition, for practical
purposes, students who suffer only emotional harm at the hands school officials lack
the “last line” of defense provided by the Constitution. School officials consequently
lack the constitutional incentive to “operate within the confines of their prescribed
authority” if the harm they inflict is only severe emotional harm.70
This ineffective treatment of students’ emotional harm also means that when
school officials impose severe emotional harm on students, state interests
consistently trump students’ interests. The assessment of substantive due process
claims involves a weighing of state interests against the individual’s interests.71 State
interests are framed in terms of schools’ need to maintain discipline and order.72
Student interests are their right to personal privacy and bodily integrity.73 The courts’
treatment of emotional harm, therefore, consistently orders discipline in schools as
more important than students’ interests in their own emotional integrity, no matter
how severely it is infringed.
The result of leaving an entire category of harm by the constitutional wayside is
that the only meaningful harmful contact in a constitutional sense between a public
school official and a student is physical.74 The Constitution recognizes students’
severe physical harm, but it does not recognize their severe emotional harm. This
dichotomy devalues emotional harm and the students who suffer it.

68

Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).

69

Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2001).

70

Of course the officials may be liable in tort, but again tort does not hold government
officials in their capacity as representatives of the state to the limits of their authority. It
proscribes unlawful conduct between two individuals. See supra note 66.
71
Hall called for an assessment of the need for force, which involves identifying the
government interest in the action, and the harm, which involves identifying the degree to
which a student interest in bodily integrity was transgressed. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
72

Hall made clear the state’s interest in “maintaining order in the schools” when
concluding the parents of the student in question had no right to exempt their child from
disciplinary corporal punishment in school. Id. at 610.
73

Id. at 613.

74

Nancy Levitt, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136 (1992). As Nancy Levitt has
pointed out in discussing emotional and mental distress torts, this outcome creates a
“mythology about what qualifies as valid injuries. Injuries—to be considered “real”—must be
physical, visible, or discernible.” Id. at 174.
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2. Unavoidability
These constitutional protections from abuses of government authority are
particularly necessary because when school officials inflict emotional harm on
students, the students cannot avoid it. Every state has a compulsory public school
attendance law. 75 The vast majority of students attend public schools in order to
comply with these laws.76 For those students, then, the infliction of emotional harm
in school is virtually unavoidable.77 Public school students are at the mercy of state
75

Compulsory attendance laws are codified in each of the fifty states. ALA. CODE § 16-283 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-802 (LexisNexis 2012);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (2009); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-33-104 (2012); CON. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 1003.21 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 302A-1132 (1996); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-202 (2009); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-1
(2009); IND. CODE § 20-33-2-6 (2005); IOWA CODE § 299.1A (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 721111 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:221
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301
(West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 76, § 1 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1561 (2009);
MINN. STAT. § 120A.22 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (2009); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 167.031 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-201
(West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.040 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.1
(2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-2 (2007); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15.1-20-01 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.01 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 10105 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.010 (2012); 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-13 (2012); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 16-19-1 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-1
(2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3001 (2003); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.085 (West 2007);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (2009); VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.225.010 (1998); W. VA. CODE § 188-1(a) (2010); WIS. STAT. § 118.15 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-102 (2010). Students can
avoid attendance at traditional public schools if their parents opt to send them to alternatives
such as charter schools or homeschools. See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc). Significantly, these options do not exist
for every student. Parents who have work obligations cannot homeschool their children, and
charter schools have limited enrollment.
76
Of course some students attend home schools or private schools. However, the number
of students attending home schools or private schools remains relatively very low compared to
the number of students in public schools. According to the most recent data available, in the
2010-2011 academic year 49,177,617 students attended public school in the United States.
Digest of Education Statistics, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.
gov/pubs2012/pesschools10/tables/table_03.asp. In 2007, the most recent year for which
information is available, approximately 1.5 million students attended home schools. Digest of
Education Statistics, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_040.asp. In the 2009-2010 academic year, also the most
recent year for which data is available, 4,700,119 children attended private schools.
77

Students could skip school to avoid the harm, but then they or their parents face
potential punishment through truancy laws. ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1 to -24; ALASKA STAT.
§§ 14.30.010 to .047; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201; CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 48200 to 48361; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-33-104, -107, -107.5, -108; CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 10-184 to -202f; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2702 to 2706; D.C. CODE §§ 38201 to -209; FLA. STAT. §§ 1003.21 to .29; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-690.1; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 302A-1132; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 33-201 to -212; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 to -16; IND.
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officials for their psychological well being in school. Yet as the jurisprudence now
stands, when officials abuse that authority the Constitution is not offended.
Given the degree of emotional harm that can occur when students are abused in
school by school officials, these results are untenable. Students’ emotional harm can
take the form of debilitating psychological disabilities as it did in T.W. As a result of
months of repeated verbal and emotional abuse by his teacher,78 T.W. “had trouble
sleeping, became stressed, developed trust issues and panic attacks.”79 Eventually,
T.W. dropped out of school as a result of the emotional harm he suffered in Garrett’s
classroom, resulting in loss of educational attainment.80 This kind of harm can last
years, far longer than many forms of physical harm, as students relive the emotional
harm in their memories.81 In addition, if a student drops out of school as a result of
emotional harm suffered in school, the economic harm can be substantial.82 If a
CODE ANN. §§ 20-33-2-5 to -47; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299.1 to .24; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 721111; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.010 to .270; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.221 to .226; ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 20(A), § 5001(A); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76,
§§ 1 to 4; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1561 to .1599; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120a.22 to
120a.36; MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (amended 2013); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 167.031 to .111;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-101 to -111; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201 to -210; NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 392.040 to .125; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193:1, :7, :16 to :18; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18a:
38-25 to -36; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-12-2, -7 to -9; N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3201 to 3234; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 115c-378 to -383; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-20-01 to -04; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3321.01 to .13; OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 10-105; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.010 to .110; 24
PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1326 to -1339; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-19-1 to -10; S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 59-65-10 to -90; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 13-27-1 to -29; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-3005
to -3019; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.085 to .0952; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-101 to 106; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1121 to 1130; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-254 to -269.1; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010; W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1; WIS. STAT. §§ 118.15 to .163; WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-101 to -107. So their choice, then, is to either suffer severe emotional
harm or the consequences of violating compulsory education laws.
78
Although the use of the term “abuse” has specific legal meaning, and in fact Garrett was
found guilty by a jury of one count of child abuse because of her actions in T.W.’s classroom,
here the term is used because the Court termed Garrett’s behaviors “abusive.” T.W. ex rel.
Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 594 (11th Cir. 2010).
79
Id. at 596. T.W. also suffered some minor physical harm in the form of bruising. Id. at
601. Psychologists who evaluated T.W. concluded that “Garrett’s actions ‘aggravated
[T.W.’s] developmental disability, increasing his anger, and decreasing his adaptive
functioning.’” Id. T.W. also developed symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id.
80
Two psychologists concluded that T.W. dropped out of school as a direct result of the
abuse and harm he suffered in Garrett’s classroom. Id.
81

Naomi I. Eisenberger, Broken Hearts and Broken Bones: A Neural Perspective on the
Similarities Between Social and Physical Pain, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE
42 (2012) [hereinafter Eisenberger, Broken Hearts]. Neuropsychological evidence shows that
emotional harm can be longer lasting than physical harm because a person can relive the
experience of the emotional pain and feel it again. Id. at 45.
82
Students who drop out of school in their teens and 20s are “less likely to be active labor
force participants than their better educated peers, and they frequently experience
considerably higher unemployment rates when they do seek work. As a consequence, they are
much less likely to be employed than their better educated peers across the nation.” Andrew
Sum et al., The Consequences of Dropping Out of High School, Center for Labor Market
Studies, Northeastern University, at 2 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.northeastern.edu/
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student suffering suicidal ideation, as in cases such as Costello v. Mitchell Public
School District, and follows through on those thoughts, the harm can be total and
irreparable.83 When the government infringement on students’ personal privacy and
bodily integrity results in such severe and unavoidable harm, the Constitution should
protect them. Yet effectively it does not. These results of the courts’ distinction in
treatment of students’ emotional harm beg the question: Why do the courts treat
emotional harm differently than physical harm in these cases?
II. WHY PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS’ CLAIMS BASED ON EMOTIONAL HARM “HAVE
NOT FARED WELL”84
The courts have been explicit that students have a very difficult time succeeding
in substantive due process claims that are based on emotional harm.85 They have
pointedly observed that the claims “have not fared well.”86 The courts have been less
explicit, though, about why the claims have not fared well. Possible explanations
include: that in some cases the courts can rely on physical harm to decide outcomes
without reaching the emotional harm; a need to protect the Constitution from
becoming a source for relatively insignificant tort claims; and supporting a policy of
deference to school officials’ disciplinary authority. Each of these explanations,
though, is unsatisfactory; therefore, another explanation is necessary. This Part
concludes by offering emotions stigma as that alternative explanation.
A. Possible, But Unsatisfactory, Explanations
1. The Ease and Efficiency of Relying on Sufficiently Severe and Objectively
Verifiable Physical Harm
Both the causes and effects of physical harm seem more objectively verifiable
and therefore easier to assess than those of emotional harm. This ease of assessment
may explain why courts, when they can, rely on physical harm to decide substantive
due process claims in favor of students. When a student’s unbroken arm is broken
immediately following a beating, the cause is apparent. The effects of that beating
can be objectively verified by looking at an x-ray.
In contrast, the causes and effects of emotional harm can be less clear. These
causation problems involve questions about how much psychological distress
clms/wp-content/uploads/The_Consequences_of_Dropping_Out_of_High_School.pdf;
see
also Alliance for Excellent Education, The High Cost of School Dropouts: What the Nation
Pays for Inadequate High Schools, at 1 (Nov. 2011), available at http://all4ed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/HighCost.pdf (noting the difference in annual pay for a high school
graduate as compared to a high school dropout: $27,380 versus $19,540 in 2009). In addition,
“the incidence of institutionalization problems among young high school dropouts was more
than 63 times higher than among young four year college graduates.” Sum et al., supra at 9.
These statistics are not limited to students without disabilities; they include students with
disabilities and apply regardless of ability level. For T.W., then, the loss of a high school
diploma likely will mean more difficulty with employment and earning an income than if he
had not dropped out of school.
83

Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 F.3d 916, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2001).

84

Dockery v. Barnett, 167 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

85

See, e.g., id.

86

Id. at 603.
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students may have had prior to their abuse by school officials.87 In cases where
students had some psychological distress prior to their abuse by school officials,
precisely what amount school officials caused can be difficult to determine. In
addition, individuals, including students, could conceivably fake the effects of
emotional harm. Malingering, therefore, is a concern.88
Deciding cases on the basis of objectively verifiable physical harm seems not
only easier but also more efficient. When the objective evidence of physical harm’s
causes and effects are simply more obvious and available (x-rays, for example, are
common), the courts have adequate bases to decide cases. The appellate courts need
not spend time and resources evaluating emotional harm when the physical harm
will suffice.
This line of reasoning, however, provides at best a partial and therefore
unsatisfactory explanation for the courts’ distinct treatment of emotional harm in
students’ substantive due process claims. First, although the causes and effects of
physical harm may be easier to objectively verify than those of emotional harm, the
causes and effects of emotional harm can be objectively verified. Evidence of
emotional harm and its severity exists in the form of independent psychological
examinations and reports.89 In addition, neuroscience has also shown that emotional
harm can be physically and objectively verified.90 Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) scans show where emotional pain physically affects the brain.91

87

DOBBS, supra note 66, at § 302. Dobbs notes that emotional distress cases in torts raise
questions “about how deep-seated it is” and given that “some persons cope with distress better
than others.” Id. Indeed, for these reasons emotional distress claims were not even recognized
in the Restatement of Torts until 1965. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § Scope (1965). Courts were “wary of opening the
floodgates to fraudulent, frivolous, and perhaps even marginal lawsuits” based on emotional
harm in tort. Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 808 (2004).
88

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
Ch. 8 Scope Note (1965).

OF

TORTS: LIABILITY

FOR

PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM,

89
Certainly this was the case in T.W., where two psychological evaluations identified
T.W.’s post-traumatic stress symptoms, his decreased adaptive behavior, and his school drop
out to be the result of his treatment in school by his teacher, Kathleen Garrett. T.W. ex rel.
Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2010). Even tort law,
historically so reticent to recognize emotional distress harms, now acknowledges “the reality
and existence of [emotional] distress is not in doubt . . . if your child is crushed by a car, we
can believe you suffered anguish.” DOBBS, supra note 66, at § 302.
90

Betsy Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American
Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, 13 L. & NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 12 (2010). It also shows, therefore, that emotional pain is very much as real as
physical harm. Id.
91

Id. Grey has argued that distinction between emotional and physical pain is false
because of the changes in the brain that result from emotional pain. Id.; see also Eisenberger,
Broken Hearts, supra note 81; Naomi I. Eisenberger, Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of
Social Exclusion, 302 SCI. 290 (2003) [hereinafter Eisenberger, Rejection].
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Neuroscientific evidence has also shown that emotional harm can be at least as
painful as physical harm.92 Through fMRIs, scientists have found that the brain
processes both types of harm in the same area.93 As one study noted, it “seems
difficult to imagine these social experiences that do not physically wound us could
truly lead to the same kind of pain as a broken bone or an aching stomach . . .
accumulating [neuroscientific] evidence demonstrates that experiences of social and
physical pain actually rely on some of the same neurobiological and neural
substrates.”94 Emotional pain can also be more prolonged than physical pain. “While
individuals can relive the pain of social rejection or betrayal, they are less capable of
reliving the pain of physical assault or injury.”95
Courts could, then, achieve efficiency objectives by evaluating emotional harm
instead of physical harm. When presented with objective evidence of the cause,
existence, and severity of the emotional harm, the courts save nothing by evaluating
the physical harm instead of emotional harm.96 In such cases, the evaluation of
physical harm instead of emotional harm is pure choice.
Moreover, nothing requires the courts to stop assessing students’ allegations at
the point of physical harm. To the contrary, the appellate courts arguably should
evaluate all allegations before them as part of their responsibility to provide
guidance to lower courts.97 Failing to provide that guidance means that the appellate
courts will likely have to evaluate allegations of emotional harm later in other cases.
Evaluating these allegations seriatim is decidedly inefficient.
2. Protecting the Constitution and the Courts
The courts may also be wary of finding emotional harm unconstitutional because
they have an obligation to protect the Constitution and the federal courts from
becoming a basis for litigating relatively insignificant tort claims. Starting with Hall
v. Tawney, when courts have evaluated students’ substantive due process claims,
they have repeatedly emphasized that a violation of substantive due process is
92

Eisenberger, Broken Hearts, supra note 81, at 45 (finding emotional pain in the form of
social rejection and social loss as severe or more severe in the brain than physical harm).
93
Id. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown “ a pattern of activation
very similar to those found in studies of physical pain . . . evidenc[ing] that the experience and
regulation of social and physical pain share a common neuroanatomical basis.” Eisenberger,
Rejection, supra note 92, at 291; see also Michael J. Bernstein & Heather M. Claypool, Social
Exclusion and Pain Sensitivity: Why Exclusion Sometimes Hurts and Sometimes Numbs, 38
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 185 (2012); Ethan Kross et al., Social Rejection Shares
Somatosensory Representations with Physical Pain, 108 PNAS 6270 (2011).
94

Eisenberger, Broken Hearts, supra note 81, at 45.

95

Id.

96

For example, in T.W. and Meeker, both students developed symptoms of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, among other emotional harm, as a result of their treatment by school officials.
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2010);
Meeker v. Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 319 (4th Cir. 2005).
97

The Circuits’ decisions are binding on lower courts within their individual boundaries,
creating a “law of the circuits” that inevitably provides guidance to the lower courts on what
the law is and how it applies in certain circumstances. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 855 (1994).
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different than a tort.98 Since Hall, courts have continued to stress that not just any
violation of bodily integrity will constitute a substantive due process violation.99
They underscore that “the Fourteenth Amendment is not a ‘font of tort law’ that can
be used, through section 1983, to convert state tort law claims into federal causes of
action.”100 Indeed, when the Eleventh Circuit adopted a version of the Hall test for
students’ substantive due process claims, it was compelled to assure that “we do not
open the door to a flood of complaints by objecting to traditional and reasonable
corporal punishment.”101 It has also stated its responsibility to “remain vigilant in
policing the boundaries separating tort law from Constitutional law.”102
The courts’ need to protect the Constitution from misuse and misunderstanding
arguably serves to explain why emotional harm on its own has yet to successfully
support a substantive due process claim. Emotional harm is notoriously difficult to
successfully bring in tort law.103 Although intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims are recognized, they require proof of more than just some emotional harm. To
succeed, a plaintiff must show “outrageousness.”104 A showing of outrageousness
requires proof of actions that are “utterly intolerable and beyond all bounds of
civilized society.”105 If a showing of this level of conduct is required in tort, then it
would seem that something more must be required for emotional harm that offends
the Constitution, making such claims harder to establish successfully.
The rationale that students’ emotional abuse and harm allegations have not
succeeded in making out a substantive due process claim because the Constitution is
not a “font of tort law,” however, also fails to explain the treatment by the federal
courts of appeals of emotional abuse and harm claims. First, while this principle
limits overlapping tort and constitutional claims to only the egregious, it does not
preclude any overlap of tort and substantive due process claims. Tort and substantive
due process claims are not mutually exclusive.106 While the Supreme Court has
98

Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).

99

Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1258
(10th Cir. 1996).
100

Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000).

101

Id. at 1076.

102

T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 602 (11th Cir.
2010).
103
As previously discussed, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress only
entered the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in 1965, and even then the American Law
Institute “declined to extend the infliction of emotional distress to negligent conduct.” Levitt,
supra note 74, at 144. However, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS recognizes both
intentionally and negligently inflicted stand-alone emotional distress, irrespective of any
physical injury or component. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM, §§ 46-47 (1965).
104

DOBBS, supra note 66, at § 304.

105

Id. (noting a dean speaking to a faculty member in a “sexist and condescending manner”
did not constitute “outrageous” behavior).
106
As already noted, the Fourth Circuit made the point in Hall that “not every violation of
state tort and criminal assault laws will be a violation of a constitutional right . . . some of
course may be.” Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
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“rejected the lowest common denominator of customary tort liability” as insufficient
to make out a substantive due process claim,107 stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not “regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in
society,” it does protect against some injuries that could be brought as either tort or
substantive due process claims or both.108 When a state actor in his or her official
capacity causes severe harm, the matter is not one that is just attendant to living
together in daily society and that tort can redress. The matter has constitutional
implications because the State is imposing the harm and the harm is severe.109 So
while tort actions can redress matters of individual harm,110 when the individual
causing the harm is also a state actor and the harm is severe, constitutional claims are
warranted as well.
Second, this principle has not prevented students’ substantive due process claims
based on allegations of physical abuse and harm from going forward.111 The courts
find physical harm unconstitutional while operating within the confines of their
obligation to protect the Constitution from becoming a “font of tort law.” They
should then be able to find severe emotional harm unconstitutional and still uphold
these obligations.
The rationale that the Constitution must be preserved from becoming a “font of
tort law” therefore only suffices to explain why emotional harm of the kind
associated day-to-day living in society does not receive constitutional scrutiny.112 It
does not explain why severe emotional harm, such as that in T.W., has also not
survived constitutional scrutiny.113 In addition, the need to protect the Constitution
also does not explain why courts largely fail to analyze emotional abuse and harm in
general or hold them to an undefined torture standard not applied to physical harm.
The courts could still protect the Constitution while also fully analyzing emotional
abuse and harm and holding them to the same standard as physical harm.
3. Deference to Schools’ Disciplinary Authority
Another possible explanation for courts’ distinct treatment of students’ emotional
harm is that they feel obliged to defer to schools when it comes to matters of
discipline. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the

107

Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998).

108

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).

109

See supra note 13.

110

This protection is based on the assumption that the state actors are not protected by
immunities in state tort law. Although some states have eliminated such immunities, not all
have. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1079, 1145 (2002).
111

See supra Part I.A-B.

112

As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Neal, “‘not every push or shove . . . violates [a
person’s] constitutional rights.’” Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
113

See supra Part I.
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schools.”114 Moreover, the Supreme Court has underscored its deference to schools
officials’ decisions with respect to disciplinary methods in particular, stating, “the
appropriate means of maintaining school discipline is committed generally to the
discretion of school authorities subject to state law.”115 Thus, the courts “refrain
from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.”116
When disciplinary actions of public school officials include verbal or other
reprimands that cause emotional discomfort, then, the courts are reluctant to
intervene. They do not want to be in the business of parsing verbal reprimands that
may have caused more than a little emotional discomfort. Any reprimand could
cause some degree of emotional harm. Indeed, the intent of a reprimand can be, and
often is, to cause emotional harm and thereby deter further misconduct on the part of
students.
The courts’ inclination to defer to schools’ disciplinary authority also, though,
does not explain their distinct treatment of emotional harm. The courts have been
willing to intervene in matters of student discipline when they have involved
egregious physical force or physical harm.117 They do, therefore, sometimes step into
matters involving schools’ disciplinary authority. That they do intervene at times,
then, does not explain why they have never intervened when students suffer severe
stand-alone emotional harm or why they do not fully assess emotional abuse and
harm. It also does not explain why the courts have held emotional harm to an
undefined torture standard in order to justify such intervention.
B. An Alternative Explanation: Emotions Stigma
The inadequacy of these rationales to explain the courts’ collective treatment of
students’ emotional harm leaves a gap in understanding regarding why the courts
treat students emotional harm differently than physical harm. The concept identified
here as “emotions stigma” helps to fill this gap. Emotions stigma is drawn from the
phenomenon of mental illness stigma but is broader because it encompasses
skeptical or negative reactions to emotional harm generally even if it does not rise to
the level of a diagnosable mental illness.118 Its operation is apparent in the federal
114

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).

115

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977). This authority even limits parents’
ability “unilaterally to except their children from the [discipline] regime to which other
children are subject.” Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1980).
116

Yap v. Oceanside Union Free Sch. Dist., 303 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)).
117

See supra note 61.

118

In some cases, including cases involving substantive due process claims, emotions
stigma may overlap almost entirely or entirely with mental illness stigma because the degree
of severity required for emotional harm in the legal claim is so high. However, in other
contexts the required amount of emotional harm may be much lower than the threshold for a
diagnosable mental illness. For example, some child abuse laws address emotional harm that
does not rise to the level of a diagnosable mental illness. In that and other similar contexts,
emotions stigma could potentially still operate but not overlap very much, if at all, with mental
illness stigma. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202 (2012) (allowing a child to be taken into
state care upon a showing of emotional harm with a showing of any particular level of
emotional harm); LA. CHILD. CODE. ANN. art. 603 (2012) (defining “child abuse” as
endangering the emotional health of the child without any level of severity required); MISS.
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courts of appeals’ collectively distinct treatment of emotional harm in students’
substantive due process cases.
1. Mental Illness Stigma and its Causes
The field of psychology has long recognized and studied the causes and effects of
mental illness stigma.119 In general, stigmas implicate “normative derivations in
physical attributes, behavior, character.”120 They are “mark[s] of shame or
discredit.”121 They represent “unwanted effects.”122 Mental illness stigma, then,
represents the negative attributions and unwanted effects associated with people with
mental illness.123 It consists of both the perceptions about and reactions to
individuals with mental illness.124
Research has shown the most common cause of mental illness stigma is
attributions about its controllability.125 Lay individuals perceive that persons with
mental illness can control their mental illnesses.126 Persons with mental illness are
therefore perceived to be personally responsible for their mental illnesses because
they have failed to exercise their own ability to control them.127
A second component of mental illness stigma is social rejection or avoidance of
individuals with mental illness. When individuals perceive that the mental illness is
controllable, they exhibit little or no sympathy for the mentally ill individual and
little or no desire to help the individual.128 They socially reject and want to avoid
people with mental illness.129 This avoidance exists independently of perceptions
CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (2010) (defining an “abused” child as one who has suffered
emotional abuse without any specific level of severity).
119

See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 20; P. Hayward & J.A. Bright, Stigma and Mental
Illness: A Review and Critique, 6 J. MENTAL HEALTH 345 (1997); Ross M. G. Norman et al.,
The Role of Perceived Norms in the Stigmatization of Mental Illness, 43 SOC. PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 851 (2008); Daniel W. Socall & Thomas Holtgraves, The Effects
of Label and Beliefs, 33 SOC. Q. 435 (2005); Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20.
120

Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 738.

121

Stigma Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/stigma (last visited July 2, 2013).
122

Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 738.

123
Mental illness causes numerous unwanted effects, including “strained familial
relationships, employment discrimination, and general social rejection.” Feldman, supra note
20, at 138.
124

See Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20.

125

See id.; Feldman, supra note 20.

126

See Feldman, supra note 20; Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20.

127

See Feldman, supra note 20; Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20.

128

Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 740

129

Feldman, supra note 20, at 138. The most common reason individuals with mental
illness experience social distancing, social rejection, and punishment is that they are perceived
to be personally responsible for their mental illness. Id. at 147. The opposite attribution and
effect occur when injury or illness is physical in nature. When illnesses or injuries are
perceived to be purely physical, individuals perceive they are not controllable. Weiner, Perry
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regarding volatility or dangerousness of the individuals. The perception of
dangerousness is a separate cause of mental illness stigma.130
2. Emotions Stigma and its Dimensions
An emotions stigma operates in the evaluation of public school students’
emotional harm in ways parallel to how mental illness stigma operates in society.
Emotions stigma is the skeptical, sometimes negative, view of the operations of
emotions and emotional harm that discredits emotions-based legal claims. Emotions
stigma is reflected in one of two ways: a perception about or a reaction to an
emotional harm or other emotions-based claims. More specifically, the perception is,
as with mental illness stigma, that emotional harm is controllable by reason. The
reaction, also as with mental illness stigma, is avoidance. The components do not
need to work together to create the stigma. Either can discredit an emotional harm
claim.
Both the perception and reaction pieces of emotions stigma have historic roots
and are evident in the evaluation of legal claims generally, perhaps most notably in
torts. Historically, emotions and therefore emotional harm have been perceived as
controllable by reason. In this component lies the skeptical view of the operation of
emotions and emotional harm. If emotions are controllable, then they need not
manifest in harm if the individual chooses otherwise. The avoidance reaction of
emotions stigma is also rooted in history. Courts have a long history of reacting to
emotions claims by avoiding their assessment. Together or on their own, these
component parts of emotions stigma discredit emotions-based claims because they
result in the claims not being heard on their own merits.
a. The Perceived Controllability Component of Emotions Stigma
The perception that individuals can control their own emotions has deep
historical roots. It has affected understandings about the role of government, judges,
and individual with respect to their own emotional harm. Summarizing the view of
emotions, or passions, in the Federalist Papers, Doni Gewirtzman states, “Publius
envisioned ‘passions’ as diametrically opposed to reason.”131 Publius saw reason as a
mediating force on emotions, noting that “[w]hen men exercise their reason coolly
and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different
opinions on some of them.”132 Publius also went further to argue that government
was responsible for controlling emotions, or passions, through reason. He asserted,
“[b]ut it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the
government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the
government.”133
& Magnusson, supra note 20, at 741. The response based on this attribution, or perception, of
uncontrollability tends to be sadness and pity for the ill or injured person. Id. Persons
perceiving the illness or injury as physical and therefore uncontrollable will want to help those
with the perceived physical illnesses or injuries. Id.
130

Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 740-41.

131

Gewirtzman, supra note 20, at 637.

132

THE FEDERALIST NO. 50.

133

THE FEDERALIST NO. 49.
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By the Twentieth Century some voices argued against this vilification of
emotions in favor of reason, particularly with respect to how judges evaluate
cases.134 Justice Cardozo described the dominant view of reason as capable of
“lift[ing judges] . . . above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting
forces” such as “instincts and emotions and habits and convictions” in order to argue
against it.135 Although Cardozo stated, “the great tides and currents which engulf the
rest of men do not turn aside their course and pass the judges by,” he was himself
fighting the tides of perception that reason could control emotions and therefore
should serve as the sole guiding force in judicial decision making.136 Those
perceptions persist into the present. No less a judicial figure than the current Chief
Justice of the United States has asserted that his role in evaluating cases involves no
emotion or other similar influences.137
Reason has been seen as being capable of controlling the emotions not only of
judges but also the individuals alleging emotional harm. This perceived
controllability on the part of the individual is perhaps most obvious in the evaluation
of emotional harm torts. The recognition of emotional harm as a tort occurred
relatively recently in no small part because of a belief that it could be mitigated by
the individual.138 Even as the law evolved in an ad hoc way to recognize at least
some violations of emotional and mental distress in torts, though, the concept that
reason could control that harm has persisted.139 As Nancy Levitt has noted, “mental

134
For a more comprehensive analysis of this understanding of reason as capable of
controlling emotion in both government and the work of judges historically and into the
present, see Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 20, at 634-40.
135

Brennan, supra note 20, at 5.

136

Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
(1921)).

OF THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS, 167-68

137

Posner, supra note 20, at 1051. Justice John Roberts has likened his job to that of an
umpire calling balls and strikes in a baseball game. Id.
138
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, §
SCOPE (2012). The policy concerns leading courts to refuse to allow recovery for emotional
harms on their own, and therefore to not analyze those claims, included:

(1) emotional harm is less objectively verifiable than physical harm and therefore
easier for an individual to feign, to exaggerate, or to imagine; (2) emotional harm can
be widespread—a single act can affect a substantial population; (3) some degree of
emotional harm is endemic to living in society, and individuals must learn to accept
and cope with such harm; (4) giving legal credence to and permitting recovery for
emotional harm may increase its severity; and (5) related to the prior concern, while
mitigation may be important in minimizing this harm, there is little a legal system can
do to encourage or enforce mitigation.
Id.
139

Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (“Quite apart from the question how far peace of mind is a good thing
in itself, it would be quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a general securing of it. Against a
large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation
in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law
could ever be.”).
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harms are treated [by courts] as individually manufactured illnesses.”140 They are,
therefore, discredited.
b. The Avoidance Component of Emotions Stigma
The second component of emotions stigma is, as with mental illness stigma,
avoidance. More specifically, this component of emotions stigma is the judicial
avoidance of or failure to engage with emotional harm.141 In the legal analysis of
emotional harm, the avoidance is evidenced in the reluctance of courts to engage in a
full, or at times any, analysis of emotional harm. Instead, courts have often relied on
analyses of physical harm to draw conclusions about cases in which emotional harm
is alleged.142 When faced with allegations of emotional harm, therefore, the courts’
reaction is to avoid them.
As with the perception that reason can control emotions, this avoidance of
assessing emotional harm also has historic roots and is apparent in tort. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts acknowledges that courts have historically been
reluctant to remedy emotional harm on its own without a physical harm element.143
Courts have viewed stand-alone emotional harm so skeptically that it did not have
legal value without a concomitant physical harm.144 The emotional harm could not
be believed unless a physical harm verified it.145 Courts avoided the assessment of
emotional harm on its own, then, by simply rejecting it.146 This rejection of course
completely discredited the claims.
c. Substantive Due Process Claims: Ripe for the Influence of Emotions Stigma
Significantly, the evaluation of substantive due process claims is ripe for the
influence of bias or emotionally imbued perspectives, including emotions stigma.
Substantive due process represents one of the most nebulous areas for judicial
evaluation. Scholars and jurists have written about the inevitability of,147 and the
need for,148 the use of faculties such as intuition and emotion in the evaluation of
these grey areas of law, or “zones of reasonableness.”149 In these areas intuition,
140

Levitt, supra note 74, at 175-76.

141

Avoidance here is, as with mental illness stigma, not tied to volatility or dangerousness.

142
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ Scope (1965).

OF

TORTS: LIABILITY

FOR

PHYSICAL

AND

EMOTIONAL HARM,

143

Id. The Restatement notes that “policy concerns often led courts to declare that actors
had ‘no duty’ to prevent pure emotional harm, except in some narrowly defined areas.”
144
Id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 66, at §§ 302-03 (generally and with respect to
intentional infliction of emotional distress torts); id. at § 308 (regarding negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims).
145

See id.

146

Id.

147

Posner, supra note 20, at 1065-66.

148

Brennan, supra note 20, at 13.

149

Interestingly Posner, identifying emotions as a “form of thought,” declines to adopt the
binary of reason versus emotions. Posner, supra note 20, at 1063.
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emotions,150 and other not-purely rational forms of evaluation play a role because
clear legal rules or precedent generally do not dictate outcomes.151 In the zone of
reasonableness, the judge can make “a decision either way that can be defended
persuasively, or at least plausibly, using the resources of judicial rhetoric.”152
Nowhere is the zone of reasonableness wider than in constitutional decisionmaking “because constitutional text provides little guidance and emotion opposes
dispassionate consideration of the systemic factors that induce judges to rein in their
discretion.”153 Taking the matter further, Justice Brennan even postulated that the
due process clause in particular requires the injection of emotion, or “passion” as he
called it, because the substantive due process clause’s very existence serves to
“balance . . . the everyday exchanges between government and citizen.”154 That
balance, he said, requires “draw[ing] on our own experience,” including our
passions.155
d. Emotions Stigma and Students’ Substantive Due Process Claims
Emotions and faculties other than reason, then, have an impact on the judicial
evaluation of matters falling into the zone of reasonableness in general and
substantive due process in particular. In the context of students’ substantive due
process claims, emotions stigma is one particular faculty at work. Both of the
components of emotions stigma are reflected in the courts’ evaluations of students’
emotional harm. The first component, the perception that the individual can control
emotions, is reflected in the courts’ use of the undefined torture standard. The second
component, avoidance, is evidenced in the courts’ shallow analyses of students’
emotional harm.
i. “Torture:” Code for Controllability
The perceived controllability component of emotions stigma explains the
undefined torture standard to which two Circuits have held students’ emotional harm
in substantive due process cases. These courts have acknowledged that emotional
harm on its own could potentially make out a Fourteenth Amendment violation, but
only if it is tantamount to torture. Although the courts do not define their use of the
term “torture” in the context of students’ substantive due process claims and no one
definitive definition of torture exists,156 the definitions of “torture” generally involve
a context where the victims do not have control over their treatment, such as during
interrogations or imprisonment.157 This unifying characteristic suggests that when
150

Maroney, Common Sense, supra note 20, at 902. The interplay of emotion and reason in
legal evaluation has also been described as “emotional common sense,” and it too comes into
play in the zone of reasonableness. Id.
151

Posner, supra note 20, at 1053.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 1066.

154

Brennan, supra note 20, at 16.

155

Id.

156

MILLER, supra note 45, at 1.

157

Id. at 6, 15, 32. The United Nations Convention Against Torture defines torture within
the context of interrogation and also discusses the definition of torture in the context in which
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the courts “imagine” cases of emotional harm that amount to torture, they are
reaching for scenarios where students are without control and cannot control their
own harm. They are imagining potential cases where nothing—not even the
students’ own reason—can overcome, or at least mitigate, their emotional harm.
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ reliance on Rochin v. California in Abeyta and
T.W. further supports this idea that the perceived controllability component of
emotions stigma is at work in the undefined torture standard. Those courts both state
that if some hypothetical students suffered emotional harm reaching the level of
“torture” found in Rochin, then that kind of emotional abuse and harm might be
unconstitutional. Although the Supreme Court never called the unconstitutional
police actions in Rochin “torture,” and the police actions were physical in nature, the
claimant in Rochin, significantly, had no control over his treatment.158 That the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits deem behavior that at its core involves a lack of control
“torture” evidences the lack of control inherent in the conception of torture they
applied to the students’ emotional harm in Abeyta and T.W.159 By seeking to find a
lack of control and not defining how they will find it, courts discredit emotional
harm claims. They heighten the proof required for emotional harm and thus mark the
claims as less credible.160
ii. Cursory Analyses of Emotional Harm and the Avoidance Component of Emotions
Stigma
The avoidance component of emotions stigma leaves students’ emotional harm in
substantive due process cases barely assessed or not assessed at all. When presented
with students’ emotional harm, the courts react by avoiding their assessment. They
avoid assessing emotional harm by relying on the concomitantly alleged physical
harm to determine the outcome of students’ substantive due process claims.161 The
courts also avoid assessing students’ emotional harm by engaging in shallow
analyses of it.162 In both situations, the courts do not justify their failure to fully
address the emotional harm by explaining that they need not be reached or why.163
They simply react by avoiding the students’ claims.
an individual is taken hostage under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Most, or all,
of the definitions of torture assume some lack of control on the part of the person being
tortured because of circumstances such as imprisonment or interrogation. See id.
158
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952). In Rochin, the petitioner was suspected
of selling narcotics. He was handcuffed and taken to the hospital where, at the direction of
police, doctors pumped his stomach against his will. Id.
159
Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 77 F.3d 1253, 125758 (10th Cir. 1996); T.W. v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 601-02 (11th Cir.
2010).
160

Therefore, the emotional harm allegations are also harder to prove than physical harm
allegations that do not require proof of this undefined standard. That said, arguably some
emotional harm claims could meet torture standards outlined in other contexts. See MILLER,
supra note 45.
161

See supra note 63.

162

See supra Part I.B.

163

See supra Part I.B.
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If only one or two courts avoided analyzing students’ emotional harm, then
emotions stigma would be a less plausible way of describing the courts’ avoidance
reaction to it. The avoidance might be as easily described as an instance or two of
shoddy opinion drafting.164 All the federal courts of appeals, however, have avoided
the assessment of students’ emotional harm without a fully plausible basis.165 The
consistency with which the federal courts of appeals avoid students’ emotional harm
reflects that the avoidance is not about a particular court or case. The avoidance
reaction is one that goes hand-in-hand with students’ emotional harm and is about
the emotional harm itself.
This unjustified avoidance across the federal courts of appeals discredits the
claims as insignificant or otherwise unworthy of attention. It leaves little hope that
students will prevail in substantive due process cases on the basis of emotional
harm.166 If courts do not engage in any analysis of emotional harm, they will have
difficulty concluding the harm is unconstitutional, particularly if the harm is held to
an undefined torture standard.
III. OVERCOMING EMOTIONS STIGMA AND ADDRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL
EMOTIONAL HARM
Naming emotions stigma and understanding that it can be at work in the
evaluation of public schools students’ substantive due process claims only takes the
matter so far. Overcoming its effects on the jurisprudential landscape also requires
attention. For the courts to acknowledge that emotional as well as physical harm of
students can violate the Constitution but to then never find it actually does is unfair,
devalues the significance of students’ severe emotional harm, and is therefore
untenable. When the State, through a school official, causes severe emotional harm
to a student, it raises a constitutional matter. To begin to overcome emotions stigma,
this Part proposes a paradigm for evaluating students’ emotional harm that works
within the existing Hall analytic framework. Then, applying these factors, it explains
how two cases of emotional harm, T.W. and Costello, should have come out
differently. It also advocates for raising emotions stigma in the litigation of these
cases.

164
Although only two Circuits have used the undefined torture standard with respect to
students’ emotional harm, the relatively small number of courts using it does not indicate
shoddy drafting. Because the courts affirmatively identify the undefined torture standard, their
use of it is intentional, not inadvertent.
165

See supra Part II.A.

166

This veritable lack of a realistic chance of redress in the Constitution when school
officials cause students severe emotional harm contrasts sharply with the great expansion of
schools’ authority to punish students when the inflict emotional harm on other students. This
expansion of authority has come in the form of electronic harassment or cyberbullying laws.
All states, save one, have bullying laws, and the vast majority includes electronic harassment
provisions, cyberbullying provisions, or both. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State
CyberBullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyberbulling Laws and Policy, CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH CENTER, available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_
Laws.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). A fuller analysis of this contrast, however, is the work of
another article.
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A. A New Paradigm for Evaluating Students’ Emotional Harm in Substantive Due
Process Cases
Counteracting the effects of emotions stigma in students’ substantive due process
cases can begin to be accomplished in two ways. First, the language of the Hall
analytic framework needs to change so the emphasis is not placed on “force.”167
Second, the courts need to consider specific factors within each prong of that
analytical framework when faced with allegations of emotional harm.
1. Adjusting the Language of the Hall Framework
The language of the Hall framework focuses on “force.” This language is
significant because all but one of the federal courts of appeals that have found that
students have a substantive due process right in school have taken their cues from
Hall.168 The Hall standard calls for courts to evaluate “the force applied” in students’
substantive due process claims.169 The term “force” suggests something physical. It
therefore encourages courts to focus on the physicality of the school official’s
actions and physicality of the harm, potentially to the exclusion of any other kind of
harm. It thus facilitates the avoidance component of emotions stigma by allowing
courts to neglect allegations of emotional harm. The language of the test must be
adjusted to ensure it does not facilitate emotions stigma.
The Ninth Circuit provides a helpful example of such modification. Instead of
assessing the state official’s “force,” the Ninth Circuit assesses “the governmental
action in question.”170 Substituting the words “government action” for “force” is
physicality-neutral and therefore better allows for consideration of forms of abuse
other than physical. It better allows for consideration of emotional, verbal,
psychological, and other non-physical abuse.
2. Specific Factors for the Analysis
The courts need to go further, though, and consider specific factors when
analyzing students’ substantive due process claims based on allegations of emotional
harm. When the Hall test first called for an assessment of “whether the force applied
caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was
inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely unwise excess of zeal that it
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience,” it did not identify specifically what kinds of needs could be considered
legitimate, ways to assess proportionality, what kinds of injuries could be considered
severe, and ways to identify maliciously or sadistically inspired behavior.171 The
167
The language of the test could be perceived as part of the root of the distinction in
treatment of emotional abuse and harm and physical abuse and harm claims if it were not for
the case of P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996). There the court analyzed physical and
emotional harm claims using a test that did not include language that connotes physicality. Id.
In spite of that, the court still summarily analyzed the students’ emotional harm. Thus, the
language of the test facilitates the problem but does not cause it, and changing the language
alone will not completely solve the emotions stigma problem.
168

Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).

169

Id.

170

P.B., 96 F.3d at 1304.

171

Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
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cases that have followed Hall have also failed to provide much specific guidance.
Identifying factors for evaluating verbal and other non-physical government actions
and harm and requiring courts to evaluate those factors would help overcome the
avoidance component of emotions stigma. Leaving torture out of that mix would
prevent it from being used by courts and would therefore counteract the perceived
controllability component of emotions stigma.
a. Factors Relevant in Considering the Need for Non-Physical Government Action
To assess the need for verbal or other emotional abuse, the courts have to first
identify whether there is any verbal or emotional abuse included in the government
actions in question. The change in the language from “force” to “government action”
will encourage, if not require, courts to consider verbal and other non-physical acts
in their assessments of need. In addition, the courts need guidelines for determining
the kinds of verbal and other non-physical acts that constitute emotional abuse.
These guidelines must recognize that any school official who uses vulgar names,
taunts, swears, or incites others to engage in any of those behaviors has verbally
abused a student. In addition, a teacher’s taunts that incite the student to do harm to
him- or herself, whether because it provoked the student to act out and be disciplined
or to consider harming him- or herself, constitutes verbal abuse. These acts are
verbal abuse because they constitute an abuse of power by an authority figure, are
unnecessary, and are potentially or likely harmful words.172 The verbal abuse is only
exacerbated if it occurs in front of other students because the harmful effects of the
abuse are likely compounded by the embarrassment and shame that results from
being abused in front of peers.
When assessing need, the courts should also start with the rebuttable presumption
that there is not a need for emotional abuse. This rebuttable presumption is
justifiable because rarely, if ever, will the State be able to establish a legitimate need
for emotional abuse of a child. Discipline does not require verbal or other forms of
emotional abuse.173
Instituting this rebuttable presumption does not mean that every instance of a
teacher calling a student a vulgar name will constitute a substantive due process
violation. One instance of calling a student a vulgar name will likely fail on the other
prongs of the analytic framework, including proportionality and harm. A school
official’s emotional abuse of students must nevertheless be assessed in light of its
presumed lack of need because there is so little, if any, need for it. It will also ensure
that when the emotional abuse does not fail the other prongs of the analysis, it is
protected by the Constitution.
172
Harsh verbal discipline has been shown to be counterproductive in that it increases
conduct problems and is associated with inducing depressive symptoms in adolescents. Ming-Te
Wang & Sarah Kenny, Longitudinal Links Between Fathers’ and Mothers’ Harsh Verbal
Discipline and Adolescents’ Conduct Problems and Depressive Symptoms, CHILD DEVELOPMENT
10 (2013). In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends against using yelling
or other strong verbal discipline because it is not necessary. Disciplining Your Child, AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS ONLINE, http://www.healthychildren.org/English/family-life/familydynamics/communication-discipline/pages/Disciplining-Your-Child.aspx?nfstatus=401&
nftoken=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000&nfstatusdescription=ERROR%3a+No+
local+ token (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
173

Id.
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b. Factors Relevant in Assessing the Proportionality of the Non-Physical
Government Action
In assessing the proportionality of verbal and other non-physical abuse, the
courts need to consider both the severity and quantity of the verbal or non-physical
abuse. The severity of the verbal or non-physical abuse should be determined by
considering the general offensiveness of the words used. The more offensive and
vulgar the words, the more severe they are. The word “jerk” is generally considered
less severe an epithet than “asshole” because “asshole” is more vulgar.174
In addition, the more precisely drawn the words are to the particularities of a
student, the more severe they are. Calling an accomplished athlete a bad athlete is
not particularly severe because so much evidence likely contradicts the term that it
cannot be said to be precisely drawn to the particularities of the student. In contrast,
calling a student with dyslexia “stupid” is more precisely drawn because it targets
the student’s difficulties with academics and reading; therefore, it is more severe.
Similarly, if a student has sensitivities known to the school official, exploiting those
sensitivities should also constitute emotional abuse.
Quantity must also be considered in assessing disproportionality. When there is
no need for emotional abuse, the courts should again start with a presumption that
the abuse was disproportionate.175 However, that presumption can be rebutted by
evidence that the abuse happened in one isolated incident and was not very severe in
kind. Repeated verbal or other emotional abuse increases its disproportionality.176
c. Factors Relevant in Assessing the Severity of the Emotional Harm and Malice
When looking at the severity of the emotional injury, courts first need to consider
the harm from both emotional and physical abuse. As T.W. shows, both emotional
and physical abuse can cause emotional harm.177 So if, in a case like T.W., the
174

In considering the vulgarity of a teacher’s student-directed speech, there surely is a level
of intersection with First Amendment jurisprudence. In concluding the First Amendment did
not protect a student who made a speech laced with sexual innuendo at a school assembly, the
Supreme Court stated in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), stated,
“it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils
that vulgar speech is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school
education.” Id. at 685-86. The intersectionality, then, involves not only the consideration of
what constitutes vulgar speech (and if sexual innuendo is vulgar, then surely curse words are
also vulgar), but also the juxtaposition of a school being able to punish for vulgar speech quite
freely but not being liable when school official use vulgar speech and it causes severe
emotional harm to students. This juxtaposition reflects another instance of schools’ legal
authority being expanded and given deference while legal protections for students gets
limited. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000).
175

On the basis of this kind of disproportionality alone, the Sixth Circuit in Webb v.
McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987), found physical blows to a student to violate the
Constitution. Id. at 1159. The Court stated, “[the] need . . . was so minimal or non-existent
that the alleged blows were a brutal and inhumane abuse of McCullough's official power,
literally shocking to the conscience.” Id.
176

While this point may seem obvious, it eluded the T.W. court. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v.
Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010).
177

Id.
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physical abuse caused minimal physical harm, it should still be considered insofar as
it may have caused emotional harm.
Factors that tend to establish severity of emotional harm are those that show
long-term, intractable, or irreparable harm or psychological regression. These kinds
of harms include: new symptoms of psychological diagnoses; the exacerbation of
any existing psychological disorder; any new (since the onset of abuse) and unusual
emotional reactions to school, including crying and screaming; and any
developmentally inappropriate behaviors.
Finally, when determining whether the school official’s actions were inspired by
malice or sadism, the courts should look into the subjective understandings of the
school official as well as the objective facts. If the school official had reason to know
that the treatment of the student would harm the student emotionally and did it
anyway, then the school official has acted maliciously. Even if the school official did
not know the actions would emotionally harm the student, though, severe actions (as
determined by the proportionality prong of the analytic framework) can establish
malice or sadism by their very severity.178
B. The New Paradigm Applied: T.W. and Costello
Applying these factors to two stand-alone emotional harm cases, T.W. and
Costello, shows that they could and should have come out differently. T.W. is the
case identified in this Article’s Introduction and discussed in Part I.179 Costello v.
Mitchell Public School District 79 is an Eighth Circuit case in which the Court found
that when a student, Sadonya Costello, suffered suicidal ideation and depression as a
result of her teacher calling her “retarded,” “stupid,” and “dumb” repeatedly during
her semester in his class, it did not violate the Constitution.180
Including verbal taunts, vulgarity, swear words, and words that incite others to
act against a student in the consideration of the “government action” would have
started the courts in T.W. and Costello down different analytic paths than the ones
they actually took. Considering these kinds of verbal abuse would have required the
Court in T.W. to consider the teacher’s taunts and acts of calling T.W. “lazy,”
“asshole,” “pig,” and telling him he stinks in its assessment of need.181 It would have
required the Court in Costello to consider both the teacher’s actions in calling
Sadonya “stupid,” “retarded,” and “dumb,” and the fact that he did it in front of her
classmates.182
After these considerations, the courts would then have to consider the need for
this government action. Applying the rebuttable presumption that there is no need
for verbal or non-physical abuse of students, the courts would have been unable to
find the presumption overcome. In T.W. no evidence suggested any need—
178

As the Fourth Circuit found in Meeker, a “fact-finder could certainly determine that
such beatings . . . causing [the student] to suffer ‘excruciating physical pain, inflammation of
the body,’ and ‘traumatic stress disorders,’” were “inspired by malice.” Meeker v. Edmunson,
415 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2005).
179

T.W., 610 F.3d 588.

180

Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2001).

181

T.W., 610 F.3d at 594.

182

Costello, 266 F.3d at 919.
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disciplinary, pedagogical, or otherwise—for the teacher’s verbal abuse.183 In
Costello, the teacher called Sadonya “dumb” and “retarded” for no apparent reason
other than because she was struggling in school.184 Struggling in school merits
attention and help from teachers; it does not create a need for verbal abuse.
Without a need for the verbal abuse in T.W. and Costello, the courts could not
have found proportionality between the need for the government action and the
amount of it. When there is no need, there cannot be proportionality. Further, the
State-imposed verbal abuse in both cases went on repeatedly for months, showing
disproportionality based on quantity. The disproportionality was also exacerbated
because the words were drawn to the particularities of the student. Calling T.W.,
who had intellectual and developmental disabilities, “stupid” targeted his
disabilities.185 Calling Sandoya Costello “stupid” and “retarded” exploited both her
academic difficulties and her status as a student who needed or had needed special
education services.186
If the courts considered the factors for assessing severity of harm called for in
Part III(A)(2)(c) above, they could have found the harm suffered in T.W. and
Costello severe. T.W. developed a new, long-term disability: PTSD.187 He regressed
developmentally, including by starting to urinate in multiple places.188 Sadonya
Costello also developed symptoms of new disabilities: depression and suicidal
ideation.189
The courts could have also found malice on the part of the school officials in
both T.W. and Costello. In T.W. the malice could have been found because the
teacher abusing T.W. knew from psychological evaluations that she could likely
exacerbate his disabilities by her abuse, but she nonetheless engaged in it.190
Although no evidence in Costello suggested that the teacher knew his actions were
likely to cause depression and suicidal ideation in this particular student, the
disproportionality between the need for his verbal abuse (none) and the severe abuse
shows malice.
In application, then, the factors making up the new paradigm for evaluating
emotional harm in students’ substantive due process cases can work. They work by
requiring courts to not only consider emotional harm, but also consider it effectively
and without reference to unhelpful and vague standards. They work, therefore, by
overcoming emotions stigma.
C. Recognizing the Role of Emotions Stigma in Litigation
In order to overcome emotions stigma, it must be recognized as it occurs. In the
process of litigating cases, the work of alerting judges to issues that need to be
183

T.W., 610 F.3d at 594-96.

184

Costello, 266 F.3d at 919.

185

T.W., 610 F.3d at 594.

186

Costello, 266 F.3d at 919.

187

T.W., 610 F.3d at 596.

188

Id.

189

Costello, 266 F.3d at 920.

190

T.W., 610 F.3d at 608 n.6.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

35

160

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:125

addressed falls to the lawyers and litigants. While judges surely should be alert to
their own biases and analytic missteps, they may also miss them.191 The role of the
lawyer is to ensure that judges do not miss points relevant to their analyses.
Attorneys then should alert judges that emotions stigma can play a role in the
evaluation of students’ emotional harm allegations in substantive due process cases.
Indeed, attorneys have an obligation to point out emotions stigma on behalf of their
clients in order to ensure that it does not play a role in harming the evaluation of
their claims.
Suggesting to a judge that he or she may apply a stigma about emotions in a case,
however, could be a tricky business. Lawyers understandably may not want to
offend courts by appearing to presumptuously assert that judges may apply a bias or
stigma to the analysis of the case. If Chief Justice John Roberts serves as any
example, such a suggestion may offend judges’ most basic sense of their role and
how they act in that role.192
One way to alert courts to the potential role of emotions stigma is to point out
that it has played a role in other courts’ evaluations of students’ emotional abuse and
harm claims. In this way, the lawyer can make the argument without directly
suggesting that emotions stigma might play a role in evaluations by the particular
courts before which they are appearing. In addition, attorneys should argue that the
result of emotions stigma has been to contribute to, or cause the failure of, any court
to recognize that emotional harm, no matter its severity, can on its own violate
students’ substantive due process rights. Attorneys can thereby allow the courts to
understand the problematic jurisprudential landscape that has been created by
emotions stigma so other courts can avoid contributing to it.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paradigm and related steps are envisioned as a starting point for addressing
and overcoming emotions stigma in the evaluation of students’ substantive due
process claims. Addressing emotions stigma involves addressing deeply historic
perceptions about the interaction of emotions and reason. It requires courts to begin
to meaningfully evaluate students’ allegations of emotional harm absent any physical
harm component. It also requires them to abandon meaningless torture standards
applied only to emotional, but not physical, harm. Yet, a start needs to be made.
Failing to address the operation of emotions stigma will leave the jurisprudential
landscape as is. Students like T.W., who must go to school in order to comply with
compulsory attendance laws, will continue to suffer severe, State-imposed emotional
harms, and the Constitution will not be offended. The Constitution will simply
191
Assumptions, a category similar to emotions stigma and stigmas generally, are
notoriously easy to miss because they are “taken for granted.” Assumption Definition,
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assumptions (last
visited July 2, 2013). They therefore get applied entirely or almost entirely without thought.
So too emotions stigmas can lie below the intellectual surface and be missed.
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In his Senate confirmation hearings, the Chief Justice described his role as a judge as
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Justice Roberts used it in reference to himself in no more serious a forum than his own
confirmation hearings, it is reasonable to conclude he believes it or at least wants it to be true
about himself.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/6

36

2014]

DARK SARCASM IN THE CLASSROOM

161

continue to fail to protect public school students from even very severe emotional
harm in school.
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